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Justice and the defence of rights in 
England and Wales : the case of Equity
Anne-Marie O’Connell 
University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
Résumé : 
Alors que le système connu sous le nom de Common Law se développait, un 
phénomène de fossilisation de la procédure d’accès aux tribunaux limita le recours 
à la justice pour les sujets du royaume ainsi que le pouvoir des juges (1258 Provisions 
of Oxford) . Le Roi, « Fontaine de justice » et dernier recours des pétitionnaires, 
délégua son pouvoir de rendre la justice à son Lord Chancellor, son Secrétaire d’État 
et ecclésiastique à l’origine, qui remédia à ces nombreux dénis de justice en créant 
un système destiné à corriger les défauts de la loi sans s’y substituer : l’Equity. 
Système inspiré du droit canon, l’Equity juge en fonction de ce qui est moralement 
acceptable, et introduit en droit anglais de nouveaux droits, de nouvelles procédures 
et de nouveaux remèdes.
La présente contribution analysera comment l’Equity, au moment où elle se 
constitue, peut représenter un embryon de justice réparatrice, et le Lord Chancellor 
un prototype lointain du défenseur des droits, et comment, d’autre part cette 
approche particulière du droit demeure fermement ancrée dans le système judiciaire 
anglais.
Mots-clés : 
Equity – justice - Lord Chancellor – Common Law- réparation- procédures- droits- 
défenseur.
Abstract:
As the legal system known as Common Law was developing in England, access to 
justice via the procedural writ system was abruptly limited by the 1258 Provisions 
of Oxford, which denied access to those litigants who could not fit in the existing 
claim forms and prevented judges from creating new ones. The King, “Fountain 
of Justice” and last resort for the petitioners, delegated his residual prerogative 
to render justice to his Lord Chancellor, both secretary and confessor. The latter 
remedied to this denial of justice by setting up a system of court designed to 
mitigate and correct the rigours of the law without becoming a substitute for it. 
This system, inspired by canon law and called Equity, decides cases according to 
what is morally right, and introduces new rights, new procedures and new remedies 
into English law.
The present contribution analyzes how the emerging system of Equity can be seen 
as the starting point of reparative justice, and the Lord Chancellor as the prototype 
of the defender of rights; secondly, ilt will also see the limits of this analogy by 
showing that this particular approach to law remains firmly anchored in the English 
court system.
Keywords: 
Equity – justice - Lord Chancellor – Common Law – reparation – procedures – 
rights -   defender.
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INTRODUCTION
The Office of the Human Rights Commissioner in England and Wales is a relatively 
recent creation; it can be tied to the development of Human Rights law as embodied 
by the European Convention on HR or the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. All but two of the articles in the European Convention were incorporated 
into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. In spite of all this, the history of the 
English legal system shows no clear influence from other legal traditions pertaining 
to the defence of individual rights by reference to a single overarching document. 
However, the notion of right is embedded in English law and can be defined as the 
sort of interests that society will protect, under the control of courts. John Locke, 
in his Second Treatise of Government (1698), enumerates them as: property, quiet 
enjoyment, physical integrity and civil rights such as individual freedoms provided 
that public order be not under threat (Locke 1698: 157).
But rights, like law, are part and parcel of the social fabric that gave rise to them, 
and, consequently, they are also submitted to change, not in terms of definition, but 
must be upheld consistently with the normal evolution of society. In other words, 
the defence of rights goes on a par with the manner in which equity mitigates and 
corrects the rigidity of legal rules.
In England, this corrective dimension took the form of a new approach to law 
called Equity. It emerged as a body of principles when the Common Law courts 
could no longer address those legal disputes that did not find any correspondance 
in the limited set of writs, i.e. the claim forms available to enter a plea in court. 
This led those who were denied legal remedies to petition the King, the “Fountain 
of Justice” (Goodnow 1891: 495). The latter transferred that matter to his Lord 
Chancellor, a prominent member of the Royal Council, the Keeper of the Royal 
Seal and the intermediary with the Barons who had formed the first form of 
Parliament (what would become the House of Lords). He soon assumed a full 
judicial position by setting up the Court of Chancery, the role of which was to give 
redress to plaintiffs where the Common Law courts could not, by resorting to its 
own equitable principles called the “Maxims of Equity”. With time this remedial 
institution became a court with its own rules of procedure and precedents until the 
Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 merged the Common Law courts and the Courts of 
Chancery : today all English courts can judge both at law and in equity.
The present contribution aims to address the two following issues: first, can equity 
be considered as a source of creation of rights and interests? If so, how were these 
rights defended? Finally, how far can the Lord Chancellor be considered as a 
prototypical defender of rights?
However, considering the close connection of Equity with the English court system, 
and the particular position of the Lord Chancellor, the second part will examine 
what can mitigate this vision and limit the risks of anachronism when dealing with 
Equity.
I- Equity as an early form of defence of rights
The term “equity”, meaning “fairness” illustrates Aristotle’s definition of the inner 
tension that exists within the province of law. In his Ethics, he claims that the law 
is a general principle that is applied universally and equally to every member of 
the polity and governs every aspect of society: justice is akin to equality (Book 
5, 2, 1130b30- 1131a1). However, a strict and uniform application of the law, which 
is globally desirable, may generate injustice in individual cases. It is therefore 
necessary to mitigate the rigour of the law by deciding on the ground of fairness, 
and thus make sure that law is compatible with justice, according to Aristotle’s 
Ethics (Book 5, c. 10). This must yet guarantee that the corrective dimension of 
justice does not distort the equal application of legal principles to everyone and 
every situation. This is precisely what the maxims of Equity aim to show. This series 
of short proverbs, designed by lawyers as a learning tool for students who had to 
memorize the core principles of the law, express how the pursuit of justice will 
constitute a factor of change in law. Equity also addresses the issue of accessibility 
to justice which was felt to be a key characteristic of the law. Universal applicability 
of the law implies its accessibility.
A- “Equity follows the law”
This maxim illustrates the ancillary nature of Equity that originally aimed to 
redress the hardships of the law. Common Law itself had attempted to deal with its 
increasing procedural rigidity in relation to natural law principles (Curzon 1979: 96):
In accordance with medieval principles the King has been considered as the 
Fountain of Justice, and retains a residuary jurisdiction to ensure that justice was 
done to his subjects by means of petitions addressed to him. He could issue writs 
called brevia magistralia when brevia de cursu (those issued by courts) would not deal 
with the harm complained of (Bracton 1250-56). This lasted until the Provisions of 
Oxford were enacted in 1258, which put an end to this form of judicial creativity 
by the King’s Courts. The limits put to the creation of new writs was essentially 
the result of a power struggle with the Barons, who feared the growing influence 
of the monarchy. Until then, the King’s Council (Curia Regis) could also exert a 
discretionary right to give relief on the basis of petitions received. This would define 
rights as immanent to the case in point, and privileged the claim over procedural 
constraints. From this perspective, rights are considered negatively: claiming a right 
for a plaintiff would mean having access to courts, which in turn is an acceptable 
definition of justice. But rights are also consubstantial with the outcome of the 
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case, in that it should be possible to give justice over time, which may conflict 
with the limits imposed by the rendering of a final decision. Justice thus coincides 
with the possibility to reopen a case or appeal against a decision. And indeed this 
became possible under Edward III in certain circumstances, as when new matter 
had emerged since judgment of a case had been passed. This was done by means of 
a writ of audita querela (“quarrels having been heard “). 
Accessibility to justice is also complemented by taking local circumstances into 
account, which was the case with Bills in Eyre, developed between the13th and 
the 14th centuries. It meant that travelling circuit judges in the provinces could 
exercise equitable jurisdiction throughout the realm in local assemblies called Eyre. 
With this circumstantial dimension, the law considered that rights were tied to 
specific situations, and to the necessity to adapt the law to them. This is further 
evidenced by Common Law developing actions of an equitable nature among which 
actions of covenant (when the defendant is ordered to perform his obligations) can 
be mentioned, along writs of prohibition, which were an early type of injunction, 
suits of mill (the Common Law equivalent to a perpetual injunction), writs of quia 
timet (“because he fears”), or the delay allowed by the King’s courts in repayment of 
mortgage and debt, which was akin to the equity of redemption. These measures 
devised by Common Law courts embraced the notion that the purpose of the justice 
system was to resort to what Aristotle calls “prudence”, which consists in tailoring 
the rules to the particular circumstances: it lies at the heart of decision-making, not 
in the existence of intrinsic rights owed to those seeking the intervention of courts.
The coincidence of prudential decisions and Christian (or Church) doctrine 
reassessed the concept of right more positively as Equity emerged as a body of 
doctrine. Petitions for justice were gradually considered, albeit in a prototypical 
manner, as civil rights and entitlements. Equity takes responsibility for the 
upholding of these rights, and this is impersonated by the emergence of the Lord 
Chancellor as the key official in such matters.
B- “Equity will not suffer a harm to be without remedy”
Unlike the other senior positions in the Judiciary, which emerged from the 
structure of the court system, the Lord Chancellor came from an altogether 
different background. Originally Lord Chancellors were ecclesiastics and acted as 
the King’s secretaries or even Prime Ministers of sorts, and were known as the 
“Keepers of the King’s conscience” (Burdick 2004 : 79). Petitions were addressed 
to them on appeal “for charity and in God’s name”; Chancellors were well-versed 
in canon law, and remedies were influenced by the Christian doctrine, both in form 
and in content. They were sought “in the name of reason, of right and conscience”, 
a perspective that was distinctly set in the school of Natural Law. What makes the 
Lord Chancellor so different from the Common Law judges is that he already held 
other offices : although he had no elective mandate, and did not stand to represent 
those whose rights had been violated by the government or its bureaucracy , the 
Lord chancellor cumulated many functions :as a member of the Executive, he 
was the King’s secretary and his advisor in spiritual and temporal matters, drafted 
documents and affixed the Royal Seal as a sign of authenticity (he was the Keeper 
of the Royal Seal) ; he was a member of the Great Council, to which Chancery was 
attached as an administrative service ; by the end of the 12th century, Chancery 
had become a separate department .As a member of the Legislative, he was the 
Prolocutor of the House of Lords (the older House of Parliament, chronologically), 
and thus, became in time the Speaker of the House of Lords. He was not legally 
trained in Common Law doctrines, and thus held a different view on the manner 
in which decisions of justice should be rendered. The Lord Chancellor was not 
independent from the King, but his position was singular; indeed, he became the 
first official to embody judicial redress and the possibility to give a voice to the 
petitioners whose right to justice had been denied by the rigidity of court procedure. 
In fact his way of dealing with cases that courts could not hear showed that justice 
was attached to a position, or more particularly to a person who embodied moral 
rectitude and Christian values.
C- “Equity acts on the conscience”
Equity is based on the precepts of natural law (jus naturalis) and on the laws of God, 
and its doctrine was referred to as “the doctrine of conscience”; one important 
judicial consequence was the reliance on discretion exercised by the Lord 
Chancellor himself, who conducted the examination of the defendant, to seek out 
the principles and moral standards underlying the act complained of. For the same 
reason, the Chancellor (later on, in the courts of Chancery) did not resort to juries, 
contrary to Common Law courts.  Conversely, access to Equity was more direct.
Moreover, the association of Equity to the laws of God as embodied in the concept 
of “conscience” and “conscionable act” had other effects: first, it could prevent the 
operation of a law found to be contrary to the Law of God if the plaintiff ’s hardship 
could be attributed to that law. The measuring rod in those circumstances was the 
Chancellor’s conscience, and this had to be taken literally. But it also assumed that 
the plaintiff followed the same moral principles, and that his moral conscience 
would be hurt along with his sense of justice. Secondly, when Common Law gave 
remedies “as of right”, equitable remedies were discretionary. The Lord Chancellor 
established the right that needed to be upheld by means of cross-examination, 
then he also provided the remedies that would best serve these rights: thus the 
remedies were not only discretionary, they were also the result of judicial activism 
and creativity.
Moreover, Equity acts in personam, not in rem, which means that it proceeds 
not against the defendant’s chattels but against him and his conscience. One 
consequence of this doctrine is that any attempt by a litigant to avoid or refuse to 
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comply with a court order would be considered as “contempt of court”; this was 
punishable by imprisonment.
More importantly, the Chancellor could issue a decree in the form of a “declaration 
of rights” or an “order” that would finalise his decision and impose remedies. 
Again, ignoring an order would lead to prison. The penalty also applied to the first 
stages of the proceedings when the Chancellor issued a writ of subpoena against the 
defendant summoning him to appear before him.
The importance of conscience as a tenet of a judicial doctrine was- and still is- 
such that acting unconscionably in equity would deny any relief to an otherwise 
arguable case. Hence the value of a maxim that claims “He who comes to equity 
must come with clean hands”. The procedural flexibility of procedure in equity 
derives from the role played by the Chancellor. It was therefore consistent to adopt 
a less rigid approach to procedure, which would improve access to court and justice 
for litigants. The emphasis was deliberately more on the substance of the case, and 
less on the form.
D - “Equity looks to the intent and not to the form”
Procedural rules in equity differed from procedure at Common Law in that a formal 
error would not result in the dismissal of a case. Equity aims at solving disputes, so 
it developed a certain number of procedural tools enabling the Chancellor to hear 
disputes and decide in conscience.
Proceedings commenced with a bill (petition) and not by a writ: it has no prescribed 
form, which means it was more accessible to the plaintiffs; the defendant was then 
served with a summons to attend (writ of subpoena) on pain of penalty (a “commission 
of rebellion” was issued if the writ was ignored), which can be considered as the 
ancestor of “contempt of court”. He then appeared before the Lord Chancellor and 
answered the petition orally, and then the Chancellor conducted an interrogation in 
order to “purge” his conscience if necessary. The examination of a defendant under 
oath had no parallel at Common Law at the time.
Besides, originally, proceedings were initiated in Anglo-French, then in English (and 
not in Latin contrary to the usage of the time), and all this meant that petitioners 
did not, at the beginning, need the assistance of a counsel. But the most original 
contribution of Equity to the law lies in the variety of remedies devised by the 
Court of Chancery; these remedies are still in use nowadays.
E – “Equity looks as done what ought to be done”
Equity developed remedies alongside its principles, and it also came to recognize 
rights that the courts of Common Law did not. The matter was all the more urgent 
as the creativity of the Common Law courts had been severely curtailed with the 
Provisions of Oxford; procedural rigidity did not come from law itself but as the 
result of a political struggle for power between the king – and his courts- and the 
Barons, who were not only the pillars of feudalism, but also emerged as the natural 
opponent to the monarch. One consequence of the then limited powers of the  
Curia Regis provided the bulk of the cases that were brought before the Chancellor 
and his court. First there would be matters arising out of the lack of Common Law 
remedies, notably the failure to recognize the use, and equitable interests in land 
ownership, matters pertaining to the rigidity of Common Law rules of evidence, 
as described above. Another aspect of the importance and efficacy of Equity 
concerned matters arising out of the inadequacy of damages at Common Law: the 
latter only awarded financial compensation called damages, which may not be the 
best solution to all disputes. Equity awarded specific relief, like an order to perform 
an obligation (called specific performance), or to return the goods lent to the plaintiff 
(restitution). Equity also intervenes in matters arising out of mutual agreement 
(contracts): when a dispute concerns the performance of a contract, equity is 
concerned with establishing the good faith of a party (“Equity imputes an intent to 
fulfil an obligation”): the polymorphic nature of the doctrine of conscience enables 
the Chancellor to examine the elements of contract formation, namely the intent 
that presided over the agreement. Thus his jurisdiction also encompassed matters 
arising out of fraud: Equity could prevent the Common Law enforcement of an 
agreement entered as the result of duress or fraud or misrepresentation. Likewise, 
it extended its competence to matters arising out of a transfer of debt, whereas 
Common Law did not recognize the assignment of a debt. Equity may be considered 
as a source and means to defend rights in so far as it put the person at the centre 
of the dispute, and considered the consequences of the case on the parties to the 
litigation. Emphasizing the role of conscience is also to correlate it to personal, 
moral responsibility; on this basis rights emerge, and this provides a reason to 
defend them. Conversely, even if these considerations were not completely absent 
from Common Law doctrines, the latter focused more on the rights arising out of 
the facts, and less on the intentions that gave rise to the case. Equity associated 
moral criteria to the material circumstances of the case and analysed it on the 
basis of justice as fairness. This applied to the most fundamental interest protected 
by medieval society, namely the ownership of land. It encompassed the rights of 
tenants, the rights of beneficiaries, the right to divide land, or the administration of 
estates (which led to the creation of trusts), and the clearing of debts, called equity 
of redemption. Another, more marginal jurisdiction, concerned the petitions from 
foreign merchants, who were deprived of access to Common Law courts by reason 
of their nationality.
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To sum up, Equity represents an early form of defence of rights in terms of 
accessibility, of creation of rights otherwise ignored by Common Law, which it 
aimed to supplement.
However, there are mitigating factors in that description indicative of Equity’s 
fundamental difference with the office of the Defender of Rights.
II- Equity and the protection of rights: the limits of the analogy
A – Equity was born out of the justice system, and never departed from it.
The remedial nature of Equity must be seen in the light of the existing dichotomy 
between law and justice; because of its ancillary nature, Equity remedies the hardships 
of the law; it was never alloted a specific jurisdiction entailing the guardianship and 
protection of any specific, or individual right. The following points will enlighten 
this statement: first, Equity developed its own remedies while following the 
changes incurred by Common Law courts jurisdictions; in fact it owes its existence 
to the gradual fossilization of the writ system, and not to the necessity to uphold 
rights that feudal society would consider as essential. Secondly, the Lord Chancellor 
structured his new office by setting up a court under the auspices of the Chancery. 
As a result, and like any other court, the Court of Chancery became increasingly 
technical in terms of procedure. Even if the approach to law remained distinct from 
that delivered by the Common Law courts, its everyday administration became 
similar in form. Consequently, Equity in the Court of Chancery built up its own 
precedents and specific rules of procedure: it stood as a separate jurisdiction by the 
end of the 14th century, to the extent that it acted as a “rival” system to the Common 
Law courts. The struggle for influence was embodied in the 16th and 17th centuries 
by the ongoing feud between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, head 
of King’s Bench. Beside the personal animosity between Cardinal Wolsey and the 
common lawyers, Equity and the Bench fought for the supremacy of their decisions, 
thus mirroring the rivalry between two court systems. It seems that, until the end 
of the 18th century, the court of Chancery became considerably more powerful than 
its Common Law counterparts until some rationalisation of the judiciary appeared 
to be the only solution to the incongruity of the dual court system. . An attempt 
to curb the influence of the court of Chancery came with the royal initiative to 
enforce the Statute of Uses 1535, which were enforced by Equity only ; the Court of 
Requests (“poor men’s court”) another court attached to the Court of Chancery 
came under attack, but managed to flourish until 1643 . The strife between the two 
courts, exemplified by the row that erupted between Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 
and Lord Chief Justice Coke between 1611 and 1616, was not limited to political 
considerations, since it was fueled by the common lawyers’ perception that the 
Chancery was gradually removing jurisdiction from the Common Law courts in 
increasingly important areas. Indeed Chancery had acquired a new jurisdiction 
over mercantile cases, and the Common Law courts saw their case load curtailed in 
favour of Equity, the Admiralty Court and the Court of Star Chamber, which dealt 
with political cases like treason.
The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 did not mark the end of Equity as a principle 
of justice, nor as a separate jurisdiction, but fused the two systems so that now, 
every English judge can decide at law and in equity; besides, there is still a court 
of Chancery, albeit confined to the Chancery division of the High Court, where it 
deals with areas traditionally within the province of equity, namely patents, trusts, 
the rights of shareholders and estates. This was made possible because of the 
judicial nature of the courts of Equity and of the commonality of purpose between 
the two approaches to law, both of them shaped by Natural Law theory (Blackstone 
1765). The process was also facilitated by the evolution of the office of the Lord 
Chancellor.
 
B- The peculiar position of the Lord Chancellor
The Lord Chancellor’s position gradually encompassed the various branches of 
governements, as was described in the preceding paragraphs, a state of affairs that 
was ended by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. He was involved in all areas of 
the administration of the realm, and became the head of the Judiciary as a senior 
member of the Cabinet, and also because he was in charge of the issuing of writs 
by affixing to them the Royal Seal as a sign of authenticity (Curzon: 104). In that 
sense, no other holder of a judicial position could rival with him. However, the 
Lord Chancellor had been chosen from the ranks of the Judiciary at a relatively 
early stage of the development of Equity: Cardinal Wolsey (1475-1530) was the last 
influential ecclesiastic to hold the office; he was succeeded by Sir Thomas More, 
who was legally-trained as a common lawyer; this contributed to reinforce the 
judicial nature of Equity.
But the most controversial aspect of equitable jurisdiction was the use of discretion 
granted to the Lord Chancellor. It helped create some rights, like equitable 
interests, but it also introduced some degree of arbitrariness into the judicial 
process, as exemplified by the saying according to which “Equity changes with 
the length of the Chancellor’s foot” an impression confirmed by the fact that the 
Lord Chancellor gave remedies “as a matter of grace”, not “as of right”. Besides, 
the evolution of Equity, both in jurisdiction and in power, was largely due to the 
personal influence of Lord Chancellors, more than to the specific area they dealt 
with (cf. Courtney v. Glanvil 1615 and the Earl of Oxford case 1615), which epitomised 
the strife between Lord Ellesmere, the then Lord Chancellor, and Sir Edward Coke, 
the Lord Chief Justice- which ended in the victory of Chancery thanks to the help 
of Sir Roger Bacon, the Attorney General. In the course of the 19th century, the 
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court of Chancery had become archaic in procedure and in the manner in which 
delays were imposed on litigants, thus contradicting the equitable maxim that 
“Delay defeat Equity”. The influence of Common Law on Equity was strong enough 
to impose the doctrine of precedents on the Court of Chancery, something that 
rebuked the discretionary powers enjoyed by the Lord Chancellor. The merging of 
Common Law and Equity by the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 therefore seemed to 
have solved a surviving incongruity. Maybe this convergence was finally due to the 
similarity between the two branches of law, as Lord Neuberger, former Master of 
the Rolls (the current President of the UK Supreme Court), quoting Francis Bacon, 
wrote in his speech to the Chancery Bar Association in January 2012:
 “Applying the metaphor to the law, the ant is the common lawyer, collecting 
 and using the forms of action, seeing what works and what doesn’t, 
 developing the law on an incremental, case by case, basis. The spider is the 
 civil lawyer, developing intricate, principle-based codes, which can be 
 logically and rigidly applied to all disputes and circumstances. And the bee 
 is the Chancery lawyer steeped in equity, and not relying purely on the 
 common law method or  on the civil law’s approach, but picking and 
 choosing the best of both, blending the two approaches” 
 (Neuberger 2012 : 3).
This quote seems to encapsulate the complex relation that the two approaches to 
law have developed in the course of English legal history. The influence of Equity 
has receded to just a few areas of law, like trusts or shareholders’ rights, and the 
Lord Chancellor of today has lost his traditional influence over the entire legal 
system. Yet if Equity is no longer the forum where claims are heard in matters of 
accessibility to justice, it does not signify that those issues have disappeared from 
the British legal landscape. On the contrary, as we shall see, there is still a need for 
more Equity in the justice system. 
C- Equitable values and the issue of legal aid
Since the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, 
incorporated into English law with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, access 
to justice has been interpreted in the light of Article 6. It indeed guarantees some 
fundamental protections relating to fair trials and hearings, the presumption of 
innocence, the rights of the defence, access to legal representation and to translation 
when a defendant does not speak the language of the court. This legal doctrine 
developed differently in Civil Law and in Common Law systems. Traditionally, 
the former emphasized the right to counsel in civil disputes, while Common Law 
jurisdictions focused their legal aid programmes on criminal cases (Regan 1999: 
114). In England, legal aid was established in 1949 by the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 
and it is administered in England and Wales by the Legal Aid Agency, which replaced 
the Legal Services Commission in 2013. Under the Access to Justice Act 1999, the Lord 
Chancellor can authorize the funding of cases that would otherwise fall outside the 
scope of the legal aid scheme. Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled in 20051 that denying legal aid to litigants in defamation cases could violate 
a defendant’s rights. The scope of legal aid has therefore been extended by judicial 
decisions and the Lord Chancellor can still exert some discretion in the granting of 
legal aid on a range of cases2. However, the funding system has been under attack by 
the British government for some time; in April 2013, this service was curtailed for 
a number of civil proceedings by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act  to curb the soaring costs to the State that amounted to nearly two billion 
pounds per annum. The list of cases now excluded from legal aid range from divorce 
and custody battles, to personal injury and clinical negligence, to employment, 
education, debt, benefit issues and immigration3. The legislative rationale was to act 
both as a deterrent against frivolous lawsuits and a better support for those most 
in need. The legal profession has staunchly opposed the passing of the statute, due 
to the reduced fees thay would be paid for taking legal aid cases4 and also because 
access to justice would be seriously restricted, according to a 2013 report by the 
Joint Committee of Human Rights5. This situation echoes the distant times when those 
litigants dismissed by the Common Law courts petitioned the King, then the Lord 
Chancellor, for justice. This sentiment and aspiration has not changed with time, 
but it certainly asks the question of the forum that would hear their pleas. Equity 
has ceased to exist as a court system on its own terms and it seems as though justice 
had become one step removed, financially, institutionally and geographically. The 
Court in Strasbourg, being the custodian of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, may have a say in the matter, but there is a long way to go for a claimant to 
reach it as he or she would have to bring their cases before domestic courts first 
and find a lawyer willing to do so for a pittance. Beyond the dire social situations 
behind the curtailing of legal aid and the possible tragedies that lay in waiting, one 
of the major risk for the UK would be to lose the trust of its citizens in their legal 
system. This may in turm prompt desperate individuals to take justice in their own 
hands if they are denied access to justice because they lack the means to do so. This 
is where the issue of values becomes center-stage: Equity, which owes much of its 
legal perspective to Church law, is steeped in the Natural Law tradition, which was 
a source of inspiration for many legal tradition worldwide, and so is human rights 
1 Steel & Morris v United Kingdom (2005)
2 See https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/what-you-can-get (Visited 15/10/15)
3 See http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21668005 (Visited 13/10/15)
4 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/criminal-courts-across-england-and-wales-
could-grind-to-a-halt-as-lawyers-protest-legal-aid-cuts-10346409.html (Visited 13/10/15)
5 See http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/13/further-legal-aid-restrictions-endangers-access-
justice (Visited 10/10/15)
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law. One of the cornerstones of that school of jurisprudence is the existence of a 
close connection between law and morality. Such a relation is symbolized by the 
concept of “justice”, of “fairness” that upholds the necessity to facilitate access to 
the courts and to judicial redress. As Equity no longer deals with that thorny issue 
of accessibility, as human rights concerns have been devolved to specific bodies 
and, ultimately, to a supranational court, it may be time to think of a new legal 
mechanism that would balance out the constraints of a nation’s budget and the 
essential right to be heard by a court, irrespective of one’s social background and 
financial means.
Conclusion
The office of the Lord Chancellor underwent some major changes in 2005, when a 
constitutional reform removed his legislative and judicial prerogatives: he was no 
longer Speaker of the House of Lords, and the judicial powers he had held were 
finally transferred to the Lord Chief Justice as Head of the Judiciary. He remained a 
senior member of the Cabinet, and retained his title out of reverence for tradition. 
The long history of this office shows that, in spite of the novelties introduced by 
Equity to the legal system and the rule of law, the defence of rights was not the Lord 
Chancellor’s main prerogative. The discretionary nature of his decision-making 
power could hardly be reconciled these days with the defence of rights and liberties 
for all. Unsurprisingly, the protection of such rights and liberties fell to statutes and 
the incorporation of international conventions like the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Equality and Human Rights Commission was established by the 
Equality Act 2006, and is an independent body that advocates the promotion and 
understanding of human rights among members of the public and the institutions, 
and monitors the Police Complaints Commission investigation involving a death. In 
today’s world the procedures in Equity and the craftiness of the remedies it helped 
develop may no longer correspond to the definition we give of “rights”. Yet Human 
Rights legislation and conventions share with Equity the heritage of Natural Law 
and natural rights that have shaped the face of the English and European legal 
system in the course of history.
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